Industry Analysis: Construction

Construction contracting is one of the largest industries in the world by revenue and one of the least profitable relative to its capital and labor commitment. It builds the physical infrastructure on which every other industry depends, yet it captures a sliver of the value it creates, because the people who own the resulting asset, not the people who build it, absorb most of the economic upside. Understanding why requires looking past headline market size figures and into the mechanics of how contracts are priced, how risk is allocated and where genuine scarcity exists in an industry otherwise defined by abundant, interchangeable capacity.

Industry at a glance

Construction contracting covers the execution of building and infrastructure projects: general contractors who manage overall project delivery and specialty trade contractors who perform discrete scopes such as electrical, mechanical, plumbing, concrete, steel erection and finishes. It excludes the manufacturing of building materials, which sits upstream and the architecture and engineering firms that design what contractors build, both of which are separate industries with distinct economics. The scope also excludes real estate development and ownership, since developers are the customers of construction contractors rather than participants in the contracting value chain itself.

The global construction market, spanning residential, commercial, industrial and infrastructure segments, is valued in the range of sixteen to seventeen trillion dollars annually and is forecast to grow at a compound annual rate approaching five percent through the end of the decade, according to industry market research aggregators.1 Asia-Pacific accounts for the largest regional share, driven by urbanization and infrastructure investment, followed by North America, where an aging infrastructure base and reshoring of manufacturing capacity are sustaining demand independent of the residential cycle.

Customers span all three demand categories. Business-to-consumer demand comes from homeowners commissioning renovation and custom home work. Business-to-business demand comes from developers, corporations and institutional owners commissioning commercial, industrial and multifamily projects. Business-to-government demand comes from public agencies funding transportation, water, energy and civic infrastructure, a segment that behaves counter-cyclically relative to private construction because public budgets are set independently of interest rate cycles. The industry is intensely dependent on adjacent sectors:

it consumes the output of building materials manufacturers, relies on architecture and engineering firms for design and moves in lockstep with real estate finance, since most private projects cannot proceed without a financed capital stack

Revenue models are overwhelmingly project-based rather than recurring. Contracts take the form of fixed lump sum, unit price, cost-plus with or without a guaranteed maximum and negotiated construction management arrangements, each allocating cost and schedule risk differently between owner and contractor. Capital intensity is low relative to revenue for most contractors, since equipment can be leased and labor is variable, but working capital intensity is high, because contractors routinely finance work in progress ahead of owner payment. Labor intensity is the industry's defining characteristic, with wages and subcontracted labor typically consuming fifty to sixty percent of project cost and regulation intensity is significant, spanning building codes, licensing, safety law, and, for public work, prevailing wage and procurement rules.

Industry segmentation

The industry divides most usefully by end-market and by value-chain role, since these two dimensions explain most of the variation in margin, risk and cycle sensitivity across contractors. Residential construction, covering single-family and multifamily building, is sensitive to mortgage rates and household formation and dominated by regional and local builders rather than national players. Commercial construction, covering office, retail, hospitality and mixed-use development, moves with corporate capital spending and commercial real estate financing conditions and tends to be delivered by mid-size to large regional general contractors.

Industrial and manufacturing construction, which includes data centers, semiconductor fabrication plants and energy facilities, has become the fastest-growing segment as reshoring and digital infrastructure investment accelerate and it commands premium pricing because of its technical complexity and compressed schedules. Infrastructure construction, covering transportation, water and utility projects, is funded primarily by public agencies and characterized by long project durations, heavy bonding requirements and lower but more predictable margins. Cutting across all four end-markets is the distinction between general contractors, who hold the prime contract with the owner and coordinate delivery and specialty trade contractors, who self-perform a defined scope under contract to the general contractor or directly to the owner under a construction management arrangement.

A further segmentation lens is delivery method, which increasingly determines who captures margin within a project. Design-bid-build, the traditional sequential model, forces contractors to price risk with limited design input and produces the thinnest margins. Design-build and construction manager at risk arrangements bring the contractor in earlier, allow for collaborative cost planning and generally produce better margins because risk is shared rather than transferred wholesale onto the contractor at the point of bid.

Market structure

Construction contracting is a textbook fragmented, low-differentiation industry and Porter's five forces framework explains why margins stay compressed even as demand grows steadily. Rivalry is intense because thousands of contractors compete for the same bid lists with few switching costs for owners, suppliers of scarce skilled labor and concentrated materials exert real pricing power and buyers, particularly large institutional owners, increasingly dictate contract terms that shift risk downstream. Entry barriers are low at the bottom of the market and high at the top, while substitutes exist in the form of offsite prefabrication and renovation that defer new-build demand altogether.

Bargaining power of buyers

Buyers in construction contracting range from individual homeowners to sovereign infrastructure agencies and their bargaining power correlates directly with project size and repeat volume. Large institutional owners, real estate investment trusts and corporate occupiers who commission recurring projects can extract favorable terms because contractors compete aggressively to stay on preferred bidder lists that guarantee future work. These owners have increasingly shifted toward guaranteed maximum price and lump sum contracts that transfer cost overrun risk to the contractor, a structural change from decades past when cost-plus arrangements were more common and risk sharing was more balanced.

Public sector buyers hold a distinct form of power rooted in procurement regulation rather than negotiating leverage alone. Competitive bidding rules mandated by law force contractors into price-based selection for most government work, which compresses margins further than private negotiation typically would, even though public buyers rarely default on payment, offering a credit quality advantage that private buyers cannot always match. Smaller, one-time buyers, such as individual homeowners commissioning a renovation, have comparatively little power, since they lack the volume or expertise to negotiate against a contractor's standard terms and this asymmetry is why residential remodeling margins can exceed those in institutional commercial work despite the smaller project size.

The overall trend has been toward greater buyer power at the top of the market, driven by owner consolidation and the professionalization of procurement functions inside major developers and corporations. Contractors have responded by building deeper preconstruction relationships that let them influence design and cost assumptions before a competitive bid is even issued, effectively converting a price negotiation into a relationship-based selection process.

Bargaining power of suppliers

Suppliers to construction contractors fall into two distinct categories with very different power dynamics: material and equipment suppliers and skilled labor. Material suppliers, particularly for steel, cement, lumber and copper wiring, operate in markets that are more concentrated than construction contracting itself and they can pass through commodity price volatility with little resistance because contractors typically lack long-term purchasing contracts that would lock in pricing. Tariff policy has amplified this dynamic in recent years, since import duties on steel and other structural materials flow directly into project cost with limited notice and fixed-price contracts signed before such a shock leave the contractor absorbing the difference.

Skilled labor is the more consequential supplier category and the one reshaping the industry's economics most visibly. The construction workforce is aging rapidly, with over forty percent of the current workforce expected to retire within a decade and the industry needing roughly 350,000 net new workers in 2026 alone to keep pace with demand.2 Ninety-two percent of firms report difficulty hiring qualified craft workers, which gives skilled trade labor, particularly in electrical, mechanical and controls disciplines, substantial pricing power that shows up directly in specialty contractor margins outpacing general contractor margins.

Equipment lessors and specialty subcontractors performing niche scopes, such as curtain wall installation or geotechnical work, also hold meaningful power where few qualified providers exist in a given region. Contractors have responded by investing in apprenticeship pipelines, offering signing bonuses, and, where economically justified, bringing more trade work in-house through self-performance rather than remaining purely a coordination layer dependent on external subcontractors.

Rivalry among existing competitors

Rivalry in construction contracting is severe because the industry is structurally fragmented, with millions of firms globally ranging from sole proprietors to multinational contractors and because the dominant selection mechanism, competitive bidding, is explicitly designed to force price transparency and compression. Differentiation is difficult to sustain because the deliverable, a completed building or structure to specification, is inherently commoditized once design is fixed, leaving schedule certainty, safety record and price as the primary axes of competition. Average net profit margins across the industry sit in the mid-single digits, with general contractors typically earning less than specialty trade contractors because coordination fees compress further under bidding pressure than trade labor rates do.3

Rivalry intensity also varies sharply by segment maturity and technical complexity. Standard commercial office and residential work sees the fiercest price competition because barriers to bidding are low and many qualified competitors exist in most metropolitan markets. Industrial and infrastructure megaprojects see less direct rivalry because only a small number of contractors carry the bonding capacity, balance sheet and technical track record to be prequalified, effectively narrowing the competitive set to an oligopoly within that niche even though the broader industry remains fragmented.

Regional dynamics matter enormously, since construction is fundamentally a local business constrained by labor markets, permitting relationships and logistics costs; a contractor dominant in one metropolitan area often has no presence three hundred miles away. This localism has historically protected incumbents from national-scale competitive entry, though private equity-backed roll-ups of specialty trade contractors are beginning to erode that protection by building multi-region platforms with centralized back-office and purchasing functions.

Threat of new entrants

The threat of new entrants in construction contracting is bifurcated sharply by project scale and this bifurcation is one of the industry's least appreciated structural features. At the bottom of the market, entry barriers are genuinely low: a licensed tradesperson with basic tools and a truck can begin bidding residential and small commercial work almost immediately, which is precisely why that segment is so competitive and margin-compressed. Licensing requirements exist but are neither expensive nor slow to satisfy in most jurisdictions and working capital needs are modest because homeowners and small commercial clients typically pay deposits upfront.

At the top of the market, entry barriers are formidable and largely invisible to outside observers focused only on capital requirements. Surety bonding, required for most large commercial and public projects, depends on a contractor's audited financial history and track record, meaning a new entrant literally cannot obtain the bonding capacity needed to bid a hundred-million-dollar project regardless of how much cash it has on hand. Owner prequalification processes for large private and public work similarly require documented safety performance, reference projects and often years of relationship-building before a contractor is even invited to bid, which functions as a durable moat that capital alone cannot overcome quickly.

Technology-enabled entrants, including modular and prefabrication-focused startups, represent the most credible new entry vector, because they compete on a different value proposition, speed and cost predictability, rather than trying to out-bid incumbents on traditional terms. Their success has been mixed, with several well-funded modular construction startups failing despite genuine technical merit, largely because construction's project-specific, relationship-driven procurement process resists the standardized, product-like approach that made disruption work in other industries.

Threat of substitutes

Substitutes for new-build construction contracting fall into three categories: renovation and adaptive reuse of existing structures, offsite manufacturing that displaces onsite trade labor, and, in the broadest sense, deferral through leasing or extended use of existing assets rather than commissioning new construction. Renovation is a genuine substitute for new commercial and residential construction whenever interest rates rise or new-build costs spike, since owners can often achieve comparable functional outcomes at lower capital cost by upgrading an existing asset rather than building new. This substitution effect has grown more pronounced as construction costs and financing rates have both climbed, making adaptive reuse of office and industrial buildings increasingly attractive relative to ground-up development.

Modular and prefabricated construction represents a substitute within the delivery process itself rather than a substitute for construction demand overall, since it still requires a contractor to assemble and finish the structure onsite, but it substitutes offsite factory labor for onsite trade labor. McKinsey research indicates modular projects can be completed twenty to fifty percent faster than conventional builds and the modular market across the United States and Europe is projected to reach roughly $130 billion by 2030.4 This shift matters strategically because it moves value capture away from onsite general contractors and specialty trades toward the factory owner, who behaves more like a manufacturer than a traditional contractor.

The most consequential long-run substitute is simply deferred or reduced construction demand itself, driven by remote work reducing office space needs, urban infill reducing greenfield residential development and climate-adaptive retrofit programs substituting for new infrastructure in some jurisdictions. None of these forces threaten to eliminate construction demand, since physical infrastructure inherently depreciates and requires replacement, but they do reshape which segments grow and which stagnate over a multi-decade horizon.

Value chain and profit pools

The construction value chain runs from upstream material and equipment inputs through design coordination, project execution and finally facility handover, with distinct economics at each stage. Upstream inputs, comprising cement, steel, lumber, glass and mechanical equipment, are supplied by manufacturers who typically hold stronger pricing power than the contractors who purchase from them, because materials markets are more concentrated and less bid-driven than contracting itself. Preconstruction and design coordination, where contractors work alongside architects and engineers to develop constructible, cost-modeled designs before construction begins, has become an increasingly valuable stage, since contractors who participate early can shape scope in ways that reduce their own execution risk later.

Execution, comprising the actual construction work performed by general contractors and specialty trades, is the largest stage by revenue but the thinnest by margin, since it bears the direct cost and schedule risk of the project and faces the most direct price competition. Distribution and logistics, covering the movement of materials to jobsites and the sequencing of trade access, has grown in strategic importance as supply chain disruptions have made just-in-time material delivery a genuine competitive differentiator rather than a background operational detail. The customer interface stage, encompassing owner relationship management, change order negotiation and warranty service after completion, determines repeat business and referral flow, which matters enormously in an industry where reputation substitutes for formal marketing.

Enabling infrastructure, comprising project management software, equipment fleets, bonding and insurance relationships and back-office financial administration, does not generate revenue directly but determines which contractors can bid larger, more complex work at all. A contractor without adequate bonding capacity or working capital management cannot access the most profitable end of the market regardless of its technical competence, making this stage a genuine gatekeeper rather than mere overhead.

Profit pool

Profit concentrates disproportionately in two places within the construction value chain: specialty trades with scarce technical labor and the preconstruction and design-assist services that precede price commitment. Mechanical, electrical and controls subcontractors consistently report gross margins in the upper teens to mid-twenties, meaningfully above the general contractor average, because they control the labor bottleneck that general contractors cannot self-perform and because their scope often expands through change orders once a project is underway. General contractors, by contrast, frequently function as coordination and risk-absorption entities that mark up subcontracted work modestly while carrying the schedule and performance risk for the entire project, a structurally disadvantaged position relative to the trades they hire.

This distribution has shifted over the past decade as owners have adopted construction management at risk and design-build delivery methods that bring contractors into the process earlier. Contractors who can offer genuine preconstruction expertise, including cost modeling, constructability analysis and value engineering, capture fees for that expertise before committing to fixed price risk, effectively front-loading margin capture into a lower-risk phase of the project. Owners who once treated preconstruction as a free service bundled into the eventual construction contract increasingly pay for it directly, recognizing that early contractor involvement reduces total project cost more than it adds in fees.

The profit pool has also shifted toward offsite and prefabrication providers, who behave economically more like manufacturers than contractors and can therefore capture margin through repeatable production efficiency rather than one-off project execution. This is the most significant structural change underway in the industry's profit distribution, since it represents a genuine departure from the project-based economics that have defined construction contracting for a century.

Industry economics and business models

Three business models dominate construction contracting, each with distinct risk and margin profiles. The traditional general contracting model, in which the contractor bids a fixed or guaranteed maximum price and subcontracts most execution to specialty trades, is asset-light in terms of owned equipment but risk-heavy in terms of price and schedule exposure, since the contractor bears the consequence of subcontractor default, material cost spikes, or weather delays largely alone. This model scales through volume and geographic reach and profitability depends heavily on disciplined estimating and rigorous subcontractor risk management rather than on any proprietary technical advantage.

The self-performing specialty trade model, in which a contractor owns its own skilled labor force and equipment for a defined scope such as electrical or mechanical work, is more capital and labor intensive but earns structurally better margins because it controls the scarce resource directly rather than renting it. This model scales through labor force growth and utilization management, meaning the central operating challenge is keeping skilled crews continuously billable across a pipeline of projects, a genuine scheduling and business development discipline rather than a purely technical one.

The offsite manufacturing and modular model, still a small but growing share of total construction volume, converts construction from a project-based service into something closer to a manufactured product business, with fixed factory costs, standardized components and margin driven by production throughput rather than project-specific bidding. This model requires significant upfront capital investment in factory infrastructure and carries real demand-cyclicality risk, since factory overhead does not flex downward as easily as a traditional contractor's variable labor cost base does during a downturn.

Cost drivers and scalability

Labor and subcontracted trade costs dominate the construction cost structure, typically representing fifty to sixty percent of total project cost, with materials contributing another twenty-five to thirty-five percent and overhead and equipment making up the remainder. This cost structure is overwhelmingly variable rather than fixed for traditional general contractors, since labor is hired project by project and equipment is largely leased, which gives contractors genuine flexibility to scale activity up and down with demand but limits the economies of scale available to larger firms, since a bigger contractor does not meaningfully reduce its per-unit labor or material cost simply through size.

Economies of scale in construction are real but narrower than in manufacturing industries, concentrated mainly in purchasing power for materials and equipment, access to lower-cost capital and bonding and the ability to spread fixed back-office and technology costs across a larger project base. A national specialty trade platform, for instance, can negotiate better pricing on copper wire or electrical components than a single regional shop and can amortize investment in project management software and estimating tools across many more billable hours. Economies of scope exist for contractors who self-perform multiple trades on the same project, since coordinating fewer parties reduces the transaction costs and schedule risk inherent in managing many separate subcontractors.

Unit economics in construction center on labor utilization, the percentage of a crew's available hours that are billed to active projects, which functions much like billable utilization in professional services. A specialty trade contractor with crews sitting idle between projects destroys margin just as surely as a consulting firm with unbilled staff, which is why backlog visibility and pipeline management are as central to construction profitability as technical execution quality itself. There is no meaningful flywheel effect in traditional contracting, since each project is a discrete engagement, but reputation and repeat owner relationships function as a slow-building, non-scalable version of a growth loop, where consistent on-time, on-budget delivery generates referral-based demand that reduces future bidding and marketing costs.

Moats, advantages and strategic levers

Durable advantage in construction contracting is scarcer than the industry's revenue scale might suggest and it concentrates in a handful of genuinely defensible positions. Bonding capacity and balance sheet strength function as a regulatory-adjacent moat, since surety companies will not extend bonding to contractors without a demonstrated financial and performance track record, which locks incumbents into the large-project segment in a way that new capital alone cannot dislodge. Self-performed labor capability in scarce trades is a genuine scarcity-based moat, since a contractor with a deep bench of certified electricians or controls technicians controls a resource that competitors cannot simply hire away at will in a tight labor market.

Switching costs exist meaningfully for institutional owners who have built multi-project relationships with a preferred contractor, since re-qualifying a new contractor carries real diligence cost and performance risk that owners are often reluctant to bear for incremental price savings. Data and learning advantages are emerging but still nascent; contractors who have systematically captured cost and schedule data across many projects can price risk more accurately than competitors relying on rule-of-thumb estimating, though this advantage remains far less developed than in industries with longer histories of digital instrumentation.

Regulatory moats exist narrowly in licensing and safety certification requirements, which exclude unqualified entrants but do little to protect qualified incumbents from each other, since most competent contractors in a region satisfy the same regulatory bar. The most durable moat available to a contractor, ultimately, is the compounding effect of a strong safety record, financial capacity and owner relationships reinforcing each other over successive project cycles, none of which can be purchased quickly by a well-funded new entrant.

Strategic levers

An entrant or incumbent seeking to build a defensible construction contracting business has several concrete levers available and success typically depends on pulling two or three of them coherently rather than attempting all at once. Segment focus, choosing a specific end-market such as data center construction or healthcare facility renovation rather than competing as a generalist, allows a contractor to build deep technical expertise and owner relationships that a broad-based competitor cannot easily match and it is the single most reliable lever for escaping commodity pricing.

Vertical integration into self-performed trade labor, rather than remaining purely a coordination-focused general contractor, captures the higher margin available in scarce skilled trades and reduces exposure to subcontractor default, though it requires committing to workforce development and utilization management as a core competency rather than an outsourced function. Geographic expansion carries real limits in this industry because construction is fundamentally local, constrained by labor markets and permitting relationships, so expansion tends to work best through disciplined market-by-market entry backed by local leadership hires rather than centralized national bidding.

Delivery method sophistication, building genuine capability in design-build and construction management at risk arrangements rather than competing solely on design-bid-build price, shifts a contractor's economics from pure price competition toward value-based selection criteria that reward technical and preconstruction expertise. Finally, investment in offsite prefabrication capability, even on a modest scale integrated into a traditional contracting business rather than a standalone factory, offers a genuine path to schedule and cost advantage as skilled labor scarcity continues to worsen across the industry.

Structural risks, regulation and trends

The construction industry faces four structural risks that recur across cycles and deserve explicit management attention rather than being treated as unavoidable background noise. Regulatory risk includes shifting building codes, energy efficiency mandates and immigration policy affecting the labor supply, all of which can change project cost and availability with limited lead time for contractors to adjust. Technology disruption risk is currently modest but growing, as offsite manufacturing and automation slowly erode the labor-intensive execution model that has defined the industry for a century, favoring contractors who invest early in these capabilities over those who wait.

Commodity and price risk remains acute because fixed-price contracts signed months before execution expose contractors directly to steel, lumber and copper price volatility and tariff policy has made this risk considerably harder to model than it was a decade ago. Geopolitical and supply chain risk affects the availability and cost of imported materials and equipment and it interacts with immigration policy to constrain the labor supply simultaneously, a double exposure that is unique to construction relative to most other services industries.

On the demand side, secular trends favor the industry overall even as they redistribute activity across segments. Infrastructure investment, data center and industrial construction tied to digital and manufacturing reshoring and an aging building stock requiring renovation all sustain long-run demand, as does McKinsey's identification of a $1.6 trillion value-added opportunity if the industry closed its persistent productivity gap with the broader economy.5

Global labor productivity growth in construction has averaged only 1 percent a year over the past two decades, compared with growth of 2.8 percent for the total world economy

For entrants, the most sensible playbook is niche specialization rather than broad market entry, since the industry punishes generalists competing purely on price and rewards those who build defensible technical or geographic expertise. A build approach, hiring or training a skilled trade workforce directly, suits entrants with patient capital and a multi-year horizon, while a buy approach, acquiring an established regional trade contractor, suits entrants prioritizing speed and existing bonding capacity and both routes require deliberate regulatory strategy around licensing and safety compliance from day one. For incumbents, the priority is defending existing owner relationships and bonding capacity while selectively expanding into higher-margin preconstruction services and self-performed trade work, deepening the moats that protect against both low-cost new entrants and private equity-backed consolidation of the specialty trade base.

Caselet: Turner Construction

Turner Construction offers a clear illustration of how a century-old general contractor sustains leadership in a fragmented, low-margin industry through disciplined risk management and deliberate specialization rather than sheer scale alone. Founded in 1902 by Henry Chandlee Turner with twenty-five thousand dollars in starting capital, the firm's first project was a modest six hundred ninety dollar concrete vault for a bank in Brooklyn.6 More than a century later, Turner has grown into the largest domestic contractor in the United States by revenue, reporting record revenue and backlog with 2025 revenue reaching approximately $29.2 billion, a forty percent increase over the prior year driven substantially by data center and advanced manufacturing construction demand.

Turner's operating model reflects several of the strategic levers described earlier in this analysis. The firm has deliberately built deep sector expertise across a defined set of complex, technically demanding end-markets, including healthcare, data centers, higher education and advanced manufacturing facilities, rather than competing as an undifferentiated generalist across all construction types. This segment focus allows Turner to command premium positioning on projects where technical complexity and schedule certainty matter more to owners than marginal price differences, precisely the dynamic that separates defensible contracting positions from commodity ones described in the moats section above.

The firm operates predominantly through negotiated and construction management at risk delivery methods rather than competitive lump-sum bidding, reflecting the industry-wide shift toward early contractor involvement discussed in the value chain analysis. This positioning lets Turner participate in project cost modeling and constructability review before price is fixed, capturing preconstruction fee income and reducing the execution risk that compresses margins for contractors locked into design-bid-build competitive tendering. Turner's ownership structure also matters to its risk profile:

the firm operates as a subsidiary of Germany's Hochtief, itself majority owned by Spain's ACS Group, giving it access to a larger balance sheet and bonding capacity than an independent contractor of similar revenue could typically sustain on its own

Turner's scale advantage shows up most clearly in its ability to win the largest, most technically demanding projects in the country, the exact segment where the entry barriers described earlier, bonding capacity and owner prequalification, exclude the vast majority of the industry's smaller competitors. Its recent revenue surge, concentrated heavily in data center and semiconductor-adjacent industrial construction, illustrates how a large, well-capitalized contractor can capture disproportionate share of a fast-growing, technically complex segment even within an industry where overall growth is comparatively modest and fragmented among tens of thousands of competitors.

Yet Turner's economics still reflect the structural realities of contracting rather than escaping them. The firm employs approximately fifteen thousand people directly, a modest workforce relative to its revenue, because it subcontracts the substantial majority of actual trade execution to specialty contractors, retaining the general contracting and construction management fee rather than the higher-margin trade labor income captured further down the value chain. This is the defining tension the caselet makes visible:

even the industry's largest and most successful general contractor operates on margins that would be considered thin in almost any other sector, a structural feature of the business rather than a temporary condition Turner's scale has failed to fix

Turner's trajectory suggests the most viable path to sustained outperformance in general contracting is not size for its own sake but disciplined technical specialization paired with financial capacity sufficient to access the industry's narrow band of genuinely defensible, high-complexity project categories.

• 1global construction market size
• 2construction labor shortage statistics
• 3construction profit margin benchmarks
• 4modular construction McKinsey analysis
• 5construction productivity opportunity
• 6Turner Construction company history