

Illich's Law

Idea In Short

Illich's Law holds that beyond a certain threshold, additional input to a system stops adding value and starts destroying it. Ivan Illich developed the idea while studying healthcare, education and transportation, but the same pattern governs consulting engagements, sales pushes and leadership decisions. The practical takeaway for executives: growth in effort, headcount, hours, or process complexity has to be measured against marginal output, not total output. When a team's tenth hour of overtime yields less than its first, or a fifth layer of review slows a decision more than it improves it, the threshold has already been crossed. Leaders who track these inflection points, rather than assuming more is always better, protect performance and people at the same time. What follows explains why the threshold exists and how to catch it early.

Ivan Illich spent much of his career arguing that institutions built to help people, schools, hospitals, highways, eventually work against the people they serve once they outgrow a natural scale. He called this pattern counterproductivity and it is not the same as inefficiency or waste. A counterproductive system does not just fail to improve; it actively erodes the outcome it was built to produce, because the added input crosses from useful to harmful. Business leaders rarely use Illich's name, but they see his pattern constantly: the extra hour that adds nothing, the extra layer of review that slows the decision it was meant to protect, the extra headcount that creates more coordination than output. Illich's Law names that threshold and gives executives a reason to ask, before adding more, whether more will actually help.

Illich's Idea of Counterproductivity

Illich introduced the concept in the early 1970s, drawing on his observations of how modern institutions scale.¹ He noticed that schooling past a certain intensity produced worse learners, not better ones, because compulsory instruction crowded out the self-directed curiosity that made people educated in the first place. Medicine past a certain intensity produced sicker patients, because treatment itself introduced new risks that outweighed the

benefit of the next test or procedure. Transportation past a certain speed and scale produced less mobility, not more, because the infrastructure and time spent supporting the system consumed the hours it was supposed to save. In every case, the institution had not simply become inefficient. It had turned against its own purpose.

Illich distinguished this from ordinary diminishing returns, where each additional unit of input still adds some value, just less of it. Counterproductivity describes the point where the curve turns negative and additional input subtracts value outright. A hospital that keeps intervening past the point of benefit does not merely waste resources; it can make the patient worse off. A company that keeps adding process controls past the point of benefit does not merely slow down; it can make the decision worse than if no additional control had been added at all. That distinction matters for executives, because it changes the question from "how much more can we add" to "where does adding more start to cost us."

I choose the term *conviviality* to designate the opposite of industrial productivity

Illich used that framing to argue that a tool, or an institution, serves people only up to the scale at which it still leaves room for their own judgment and initiative. Past that scale, the tool starts running the person instead of the other way around.

How Effort Crosses Into Negative Returns

Every system that converts effort into output has a capacity and capacity is rarely a straight line. Early effort produces strong returns because the system has slack: idle capacity, willing people, unused time. As effort increases, that slack disappears and each additional unit of input has to compete with the coordination, fatigue and complexity the previous units created. Eventually the marginal cost of adding input exceeds the marginal benefit and the curve bends downward. This is the threshold Illich described and it applies whether the input is labor hours, management layers, features in a product, or dollars spent on a marketing campaign.

Research on weekly work hours illustrates the mechanism well. A widely cited analysis found that productivity per hour declines once a person works beyond roughly 50 hours a

week and falls close to zero after 55 hours, meaning a person working 70 hours produces little more than someone working 55.2 The extra 15 hours are not neutral. They come with fatigue, errors and recovery time that reduce the value of the hours that follow, so the total output curve can flatten or fall even as hours climb.

The mechanism is not unique to labor hours. It shows up wherever a system has a load limit and keeps receiving load past that limit.

Two Thresholds, Not One

It helps to separate two distinct thresholds inside Illich's Law. The first is the point of diminishing returns, where added input still helps but helps less than before. The second is the point of negative returns, where added input actively hurts. Most organizations manage the first threshold reasonably well, because it shows up gradually and rarely triggers a crisis. The second threshold is more dangerous, because crossing it can look, from the inside, like doing more of what worked before. A sales team that doubled headcount and grew revenue will often assume tripling headcount will grow revenue further, missing that the added people are now competing for the same accounts and diluting the attention each customer receives.

Where the Threshold Shows Up in Modern Organizations

The pattern surfaces across functions once a leader knows to look for it. In finance, adding a fourth or fifth layer of budget approval rarely catches more errors than the first three layers did; it mostly adds delay. In product development, adding features past what users actually need increases support cost and confusion faster than it increases adoption. In talent management, adding interview rounds past four or five yields worse hiring decisions, not better ones, because fatigue and inconsistency creep into the process. Each case follows the same shape:

early additions genuinely improve the outcome and later additions erode it

The Overtime Trap

Overtime remains the clearest and most measured example. A widely cited body of research on work hours and output has found that long hours reduce both productivity and, over time, revenue, because errors, absenteeism and turnover rise with sustained overtime.³ Consulting firms that run teams past 60 or 70 hours a week during a crunch often see the same review cycle repeated three or four times, because tired analysts make errors that better-rested colleagues would catch on the first pass. The extra hours are not free; they are borrowed from the quality of the hours that came before them.

Meetings, Complexity and Coordination Overhead

Organizational complexity follows the same curve. As companies add reporting layers, committees and coordination roles, decision speed improves at first because more voices catch more problems before they become costly. Past a certain point, though, each additional layer adds a veto without adding insight and decisions slow in proportion to the number of people who must sign off.⁴ A strategy review that once took two weeks with three approvers can take two months with nine and the ninth approver rarely adds a perspective the first eight had missed.

Recognizing the Signals Before the Curve Bends

Executives can watch for a handful of practical signals that a system has crossed, or is close to crossing, its threshold. Falling output per unit of input is the clearest signal, whether measured as decisions per meeting hour, revenue per sales call, or code shipped per engineer-day. Rising error rates during periods of high effort are another, particularly when the errors require rework that consumes more time than the original task. A third signal is employee reports of exhaustion or disengagement that track with, rather than lag behind, an increase in hours or workload; sustained overwork correlates strongly with burnout, which itself drags down the same output leaders are trying to protect.⁵

Tracking these signals requires measurement that most organizations do not routinely collect. Few finance functions measure the marginal decision quality of a fourth approval layer. Few sales organizations measure the marginal revenue of the fiftieth call a rep makes in a week. Building that measurement in, even roughly, gives leaders the data to see the threshold before it becomes a crisis rather than after.

Applying Illich's Law in Consulting and Leadership

Consultants are well placed to apply this discipline, because clients hire them specifically to add capacity and the instinct to add more, more analysts, more workstreams, more deliverables, runs directly against the threshold Illich described. The better practice is to size an engagement to the client's actual decision-making capacity, not to the budget available. A steering committee that can absorb one major recommendation a month will not process five, no matter how many consultants generate them; the extra work sits unused and its cost still shows up on the invoice.

The same discipline applies inside client organizations. Leaders who default to adding people, hours, or process whenever a target slips should first ask what the marginal unit of that input is actually worth right now. A team that has already stretched past 50 hours a week is not helped by a mandate for 60; a rested team working fewer hours can often outproduce it.⁶ The discipline is uncomfortable because it runs against the instinct that effort deserves reward, but the data on hours, approvals and complexity all point the same direction:

past a threshold, the reward for more effort turns negative

Building Organizations That Know When to Stop

The organizations that manage this well tend to build explicit stopping rules rather than relying on judgment in the moment. A cap on approval layers for decisions below a set dollar threshold, a hard limit on sustained overtime before mandatory recovery time, a rule that no meeting recurs without a stated decision it exists to make, all of these convert an abstract awareness of counterproductivity into an operating habit. None of them require abandoning ambition. They require separating ambition, which has no natural ceiling, from the specific inputs used to pursue it, each of which does.

Illich's Law does not argue against effort, investment, or growth. It argues that every system converting input into output has a shape and that shape bends before it flattens and falls before it plateaus. Leaders who find that bend before their competitors do gain a real advantage, because they can redirect the next unit of effort to where it still adds value instead of where it merely adds cost.

- 1Ivan Illich
- 2The Productivity Of Working Hours
- 3The Research Is Clear: Long Hours Backfire For People And For Companies
- 4Putting Organizational Complexity In Its Place
- 5Employers Need To Focus On Workplace Burnout
- 6Working More Than 50 Hours Makes You Less Productive

Summary

Illich's Law is a discipline, not a slogan. It asks leaders to measure the marginal return of the next hour, the next hire, or the next control, rather than assuming that more input always buys more output. Ivan Illich found the pattern in schools, hospitals and transport systems; consultants find it in overtime, meeting load, review chains and headcount growth. The fix is rarely to strip effort away entirely. It is to find the point where a system still serves its purpose and to stop adding past that point. Organizations that build in that discipline, through capacity limits, decision rights and honest measurement, outperform those that treat effort as a proxy for results. The next time a plan calls for more hours, more layers, or more tools, the first question should be where the threshold sits, not how fast the team can reach it.